|
||||||||||
|
Type of approach |
||
|
Definition
|
Firm-level
studies
|
National
studies
|
|
Narrow
definition
|
Almost
every evolutionary economics study of firms' competitiveness
|
Nelson
Ed. [1992]
Freeman [1987] |
|
Broad
definition
|
The
Danish approach (Lundvall and the IKE group)
|
Porter
[1990]?
|
3. General purpose institutional approaches: the case of the Vintage Regulation approach.
Several approaches relate the whole institutional architecture of an economy to its main economic characteristics in order to account for all the aspects of their growth patterns. Because of their fully fledge nature we called them general purpose institutional approaches. In fact they map the whole institutional fabric by means of a partition between all the social activities and relations that structure one's life.
Their specificity is precisely this policy of including everything in a small number of classes, from work to leisure, education and health but also government activities. The vintage regulation approach is one of such approach them (cf. the régulation school: M. Aglietta, R. Boyer, A. Lipietz,...), It organises its reading of activities around five sets of relations (wage labour, forms of competition, international relations money and public authorities). The relations between these five forms characterise the overall mode of regulation of the economy. The SSA, (Social Structures of Accumulation,) gives another example of such general purpose institutional approach although the approach is very much country specific (adapted to the case of the US economy) and period specific (tied in its structure to the institutional context of the pre 70s with a special attention given to the pressure put on workers in the labour market ( Social Structures of Accumulation (SSA) (S. Bowles, D. Gordon, ...).
Régulation theory has incorporated institutional determinants in its analysis of modern capitalist economies. The basic idea was to attribute the properties of growth regimes to a special mix of institutional forms. Five structural forms are supposed to be able to account exhaustively in an orderly way for all the whole institutional fabric of an economy. Such partition which refers to a partition in the activities of agents could easily be discussed. It has been marked in essence by the period to which it mainly applied , the fordist era and therefore by the main traits of the institutions of the time. The five structural forms of the vintage model are presented in table 2. They are complementary (a complementarity of the first type C1) as they cover in principle the whole set of institutions, even if this coverage is loose meaning that the institutions are only define in very general terms. Still this patchy description of the institutional fabric also describes some key linkages existing between broad structural forms which defines the mode of regulation of the economies under view. Beyond this institutional pattern one can observe some hierarchy between the structural forms given by their internal dynamics and the relative strength of their spill over on the dynamics of the other forms. For instance, the 'Golden age', i.e. the post war high growth period, was derived from the central role of the capital/labour accord (a.k.a. the wage/labour nexus) and this accord permeated the whole economic system via a new style for State intervention, oligopolistic competition, the credit regime and a stable international regime. In this respect, during this period, the wage-labour nexus was the driving institutional form of the growth regime. Nowadays, this hierarchy seems to be challenged since the forms of competition and forces coming from the international regime directly affect the inner organisation of the post W.W.II capital/labour accord, which gives a definition of the hierarchy of institutional forms: one form is driving the transformation of others (see Amable , Petit 1996).
Table 2
|
Structural
forms
|
When
the dynamics of the wage labour nexus is prevailing
|
When
the dynamics of the forms of competition is prevailing
|
|
Wage
labour nexus
|
Expanding
coverage and formulas
|
Expanding
non wage income, reducing welfare
|
|
Forms
of competition
|
Oligopolistic
price competition
|
Expanding
new markets and non price competitiveness
|
|
International
relations
|
Mobility
of labour
No Mobility of capital |
Mobility
of capital
No mobility of labour |
|
Money
|
Fixed
exchange rates
|
Floating
regional exchange rates
|
|
State
|
Developing
welfare state
|
Workfare and market supports
|
The role of technology in this theoretical set-up was at the interplay between productivity and demand regimes. It conveyed dynamics of innovation close to the one sketched by Kaldor in its cumulative causation model (combining the causes of increasing returns , given by a dynamics of innovation within and between firms à la Young, with the keynesian hazards of demand, as monitored by the various technologies of market intermediations). Still this dynamics and its institutional background remained rather alusive, and a broad Kaldor-Verdoorn relationship accounted for the dynamics of productivity gains.
Moreover all countries , except the United States, considered by the régulation approach were catching-up economies, and their relationship with innovation and technical progress in the Golden Age was not so much a matter of finding new products and processes than to adapt the dominant technological paradigm of mass-production to local conditions. In the fordist period of fast growth , the main institutional constraint that could bear on the dynamics of innovation was thus coming from the whole set of institutions governing the wage labour nexus.
The situation changed when Japan and Europe at least partially caught-up to the US level of productivity and when the Fordist production model experienced a crisis. Competition among firms became more centred on improvements in product quality and differentiation and less on the possibility to produce mass-consumption goods cheaply. The rapid diffusion of information technology-based products changed the principles of competition too because of the rapid technical progress in electronics. In this new regime the whole focus for the dynamics of innovation was not so much on the institutionnal context given by the labour nexus but evolved more centrally around the forms of competition (see Petit 1998).
It follows that if these comprehensive approaches help to give a general frame to the whole institutional context, they remains too broad and further specifications are needed if one is to follow the dynamics of growth and innovation in a comparative way for countries which have all experienced a similar shift towards a new growth regime. To be able to track national trajectories within one general growth regime is effectively crucial to design policies.
The approaches retaining more specific subsets of subsystems are by definition less opened to such critics of being too general. We shall rapidly present and discuss the pros and cons of studies which made a deliberate choice to retain a subset of systems.
4 Selecting subsets of sub systems.
To avoid the charybde of a narrow delineation of the relevant institutional context, which will miss a large part of the influence of the institutional fabric involved, and the scylla of a representation of the whole fabric of institutions, too broad to compare national trajectories on the issue, one can choose to select a subset of sub systems as the proper description of the relevant institutional context.
To compare these approaches, looking at the issue innovation and growth in taking account of the architecture of institutions which matter, one can not only look at the set of activities/institutions they retain (the first kind of complementarity C1) but also the reasons more or less given for their choices hint at the kind of interactions between institutions (the second kind of complementarity C2) the feature.
Table 3 gives some
of the main examples of such approaches.
.
Table 3.
Analyses of innovation and growth using subsets of sub systems to account
for the institutional context
|
Notion
|
Content |
Implication
|
Analytical
tools
|
Author(s)
|
|
Comparative
Institutional Analysis |
Firms
Financial system Labour market |
Interactions
between financial and labour market institutions
|
Theory
of growth and innovation, principal agent
|
M.Aoki
|
|
Innovation
performance
|
Firms
Finance Business association Trade unions |
Central
problem of coordination and information flows
|
Socio
economic analyses
|
Soskice
D. Hall P.
|
|
Worlds
of production
|
There
exists a multiplicity of co-ordination principles for social and
economic activities, giving as many national or sectoral configurations
|
There
are at least 4 worlds of production: interpersonal, market-based,
industrial and unmaterial, that have no reason to converge
|
Socio-economic
analyses, data analyses on sectoral statistics, history of industrialisation
paths, international comparisons
|
Salais
and Storper [1994]
|
|
Social
Systems of Production
|
Complex
of scientific and technological organisations, education systems,
industrial relations, financial systems, governing production.
|
The
different SSPs are more or less efficient according to the international
context and the nature of the dominant production paradigm. Because
of institutional inertia, there is no convergence among SSPs
|
Comparative
study of the current configuration of SSPs for the large industrialised
countries. Long run historical studies.
|
Hollingsworth
[1994]
|
|
Social
Systems of Innovation and Production
|
The
interactions between six sub-systems define the logic, coherence,
contradictions and possible ways for evolution of the SSIPs and
their macro-economic performance
|
No
necessary institutional convergence,. Differentiated patterns of
technological and economic specialisation. Different implications
in terms of macroeconomic performance
|
Theoretical
analysis (growth theory and institutional approaches, régulation
theory). Empirical analysis of 12 developed countries
|
Amable,
Barré and Boyer [1997]
|
Some of these approaches
are very comprehensive without claiming to be of universal use as the
ones surveyed in the previous subsection. For instance, the Social systems
of production approach investigates the way the different institutions
or structures of a country or region are integrated into a social configuration,
governing production processes. The concerned elements are:
the industrial relations system
the training system
the internal structure of corporate firms
the structured relationships among firms in the same industry or between suppliers and customers
the financial markets of a society
the conceptions of fairness and justice held by capital and labour
the structure of the state and its policies
a society's idiosyncratic customs and traditions as well as norms, moral principles, rules, laws and recipes for action
The main hypothesis,
common to all systemic approaches, is that all these elements cohere together,
but Hollingsworth and Boyer stress that the different elements vary in
the degree in which they are tightly coupled with each other onto a full-fledged
system. Varying degrees of coherence explicit how these authors see the
interactions between institutions working in related fields. Coherence
here may mean that institutions in these sets are re-enforcing each other
.. which as we shall see in the last section can mean that less ruling
is needed (because institutions are creating trust)
or that the
ruling is all the more binding. Clearly it goes some way towards an assessment
of the interaction between systems of activities/institutions.
The worlds of production à la Salais Storper define strong coherence or complementarities within consistent worlds. The interaction is here seen as clearly segmented.
Another example , with six sub systems, is given by the empirical analysis in Amable, Barré and Boyer [1997]. Twelve developed countries have been classified according to their institutional characteristics in the six following sub-systems :
Scientific activities (academic)
Technological and innovative activities
Productive activities,
Labour market activities,.
Educative and training activities
Financial activities
The macroeconomic performance (for the 1980s) indicators constitute a 7th set of parameters which helps to assess the main correlation between institutional profiles along the six sub systems and economic performance. The six sub-systems define Social Systems of Innovation. Emphasis is thus put on the fact that interaction between institutional contexts is not limited to the STI system (Science, Technology and Innovation) but encompasses also the effects of the institutional setting prevailing in other sub systems.
These intermediary approaches (subset of subsystems) do improve our understanding of the various growth patterns of contemporary economies. They also raised issues of interest regarding the selection of sub systems to operate as well as the validity along time and among countries of these approaches. In other words the selection depends on the question raised, but also on the period and the country. Basically these sub systems approaches also revealed some assumptions (some times drawn on empirical investigations, sometimes following appreciative theorizing) on the interactions between institutions (or between institutions contexts). It thus shows a mix of considerations on complementarity of the first and second kinds.
How are we going
to select the more satisfycing selection of sub systems and can we in
the first place compare the relevance of different selections? To work
in that direction and get an idea on the criteria to be retained we will
first try to clarify what we mean by a more complex kind of complementarity
between institutions and its implications in terms of dynamic relations
between institutions.
III SORTING AND RANKING INSTITUTIONS : FROM COMPLEMENTARITY TO HIERARCHY.
(to be completed)
Let us now address the more semantic aspect of complementarity between institutions. We considered in section II a weak notion of complementarity (the first type C1) whereby institutions were complementary according to the linkages between corresponding areas of activities. This complementarity has itself two dimensions, depending whether one considers the width of the coverage of the activities linked to the issue or its density. Still this complementarity is weak in the sense that institutions under view can be independent in the way they work. As a matter of fact this is not very likely. As we mentioned, the selection of the sub systems of activities itself already encompasses an idea of interactions between agents which tends to imply that the rules of behaviours are interdependant.
1 Around the second type of complementarity between institutions (C2).
Let us now consider the various forms of interactions that may exist between the ways in which institutions work. The interactions can be very diverse.
An institution can rely strongly on an important (influencing) pre-existing institution. In this case history matters in the construction of the institutional fabric. We can feature that path dependent effects occurred.
Another way to look at interdependence between institutions is to consider that their effects either pile up, or re-enforce each other. These interactions may well be asymetric.
Finally institutions may comply to an external cause (environmental issue, and chiefly technology characteristics).
Let us note passim that institutions need not be complementary in the first sense to be complementary in the second sense.
2 Hierarchy of institutions.
We have already mentioned the existence of a hierarchy between institutions when changes in some sub sets of institutions induce changes in others.
Similarly a hierarchy between institutions can stem from ideological representations. In other words the legitimacy of institutions may be unevenly spread.
Finally the ranking of institutions may simply follow from various degrees of obsolescence. In effect firms may respond to various institutions more or less strongly given the decaying state of these rules.
3 Causes of changes and erosion.
An important thing in identifying the set of C2 complementarities and their hierarchies is that it may help to feature the changes and obsolescence that may occur.
Institutions and institutional fabrics should not be considered as fixed. Even if it takes time in some cases they erode and disappear. Chifly they undergo on going transformation which can be read mainly at the level of C2 complementarities.
We are far to master if only to understand these long term evolutions, basically as we tend to define institution as organisation principle which in some field and some level have proved useful and have therefore lasted and diffused. Origins of institutional change differ an thing are different whether institutions have been created by legitimised public authorities or instaure by means of common practices.
It points to the importance in the life of institutions of their legitimacy, how they are perceived by actors. All of which involve the representations that people have and therefore the ideologies.
3 Conclusions.
We can now draw the preliminary conclusions brought by our investigation on how to address such issue of innovation and economic growth when considering that the institutional fabric matter. The issue we take is policy oriented. For this reason one needs to identify in a comparative ways national trajectories of countries at more or less similar development levels. Only in this range can policies expect to be effective. In such perspective studies on national systems of innovation , strictly speaking, take the risk of leaving aside important institutional linkages. On the other side broad institutional approaches such as the vintage regulation approach may set of a too broad picture to grasp national trajectories at the level required for policy designing.
Therefore studies selecting sub systems may effectively be adequate analytical tools. Still we tried to show in this contribution the importance and the difficulty of such selection. We conclude that it is crucial to take into account the very structure of the institutional fabric concerned. It means in our words to identify as much as we can the structure of the semantic complementarities C2 and the hierachies between instituions that they conveys. Reasons for the importance of such taking into account are many.
First it can help policy makers not to be misled by institutions which are not decisive but contingent to the historical construction of the institutional fabric under view.
Secondly it can help to identify the levels of internal crisis and erosion which may counterdict the conclusions drawn on the appearances. Thirdly it can suggest to innovate in the reverse engineering that policy makers are tempted to do. They can take short cuts, adapt in synthetising effect, anticipate evolutions and the like.
One should try in further research to illustrate such cases both looking at the dynamics of institutional change ( with a specific attention to obsolescence and erosion ) and at the dynamics of policy making, where imitation is often driving the first steps of the policy makers and more or less bold innovative adaptation the result of the decision making process. This concerns institutions which are fostered by public authorities and government. An issue to be explored in parallel is the reaction and institutional creation which takes place simultaneously in practices, diffusing from successful local organisations to common institutionalised practices.
Approach |
Main
institutions & organisations concerned
|
Complementarity
|
hierarchy
|
Contributors
|
|
Vintage
Régulation
|
5
institutional forms:
|
Expressed
in the dynamics of the growth regime and the mode of régulation,
the latter defined as a set of procedures and behaviours (individual
and collective) that serve to reproduce fundamental social relations
through the combination of historically determined forms, support
and steer the growth regime and ensure the compatibility of a set
of decentralised decisions
|
The
wage-labour nexus is the driving institutional form of the fordist
regime, but this hierarchy changes.
|
M.
Aglietta, R. Boyer, A. Lipietz, J. Mistral, P. Petit,
|
|
Social
Systems of production
|
Market
is but one mode of co-ordination among economic agents. There are
markets, hierarchy, communities, state, networks and associations.
Several elements are considered:
|
All
the different institutions and forms of organisation cohere together,
but the different elements vary in the degree in which they are
tightly coupled with each other onto a full-fledged system. Hence
a diversity of possible systems.
Institutions do not act through incentives alone, they shape modes of representation of the world for agents. |
Varies
with history and the configuration of institutions.
|
W.
Streeck, R. Hollingsworth, C. Sabel,
|
|
Varieties
of capitalism
|
|
Central
problems of the economy are coordination problems. Institutions
enhance information flows among actors, provide monitoring and facilitate
credible commitments, communication and the establishment of compromises
over distributional issues.
Interactions between the financial system (corporate governance) and the labour market (industrial relation) or between the Central Bank and the mode of wage bargaining. |
Not
a major issue for this approach. Observable with the structure of
power and the process of political decision-making. In Germany for
instance, domination of the bargaining institutions (labour unions
/ firms)
|
D.
Soskice, P. Hall,
|
|
Comparative
Institutional Analysis
|
|
The
features of the financial system and the labour market define a
set of incentives. Complementarity is based on the joint effects
of these combined incentives. For instance, the main-bank relationship
characteristic of Japanese industry defines a particular type of
management monitoring which reinforces the work-incentives of the
team-based work organisation within Japanese firms
|
The
financial system organisation and the pattern of work organisation
within firms implicitly drive other components of the economy.
|
M.
Aoki
|
|
Social
Systems of Innovation and Production
|
6
sub-systems:
|
The
different sub-systems are characterised by a certain mix of institutions
and organisations that are inherited from history and partly transformed
by political action and purposeful agents.
Each sub-system is characterised a set of possibilities and incentives for agents. The compatibility of each sub-system with the other defines ex-post the growth trajectories of nations. |
No
a-priori hierarchy, which depends on the historical period. The
wage-labour nexus (labour-force subsystem) in the fordist era; finance
or competition (industry subsystem) in the post-fordist period?
|
Amable,
Barré & Boyer
|
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